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ABSTRACT:
In an experimental critique of the
moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007)
present new experimental data about responses to transgressions
involving harm, where the novelty is that transgressors are
grown-ups, rather than children. Their data do not support the
moral/conventional distinction. The contrast between grown-up
and schoolyard transgressions does not seem, however, to
explain their results: they also use two schoolyard transgressions
with similar negative results for the M/C distinction.
I here attempt to explain away their results by calling attention to two mistakes in their experimental design. One refers to
the use of questionnaire-items of the type that Turiel and collaborators have called mixed-domain situations, which extend
over both a moral and a conventional domain. Participants respond to these cases differently than to prototypical moral situations, because some allow the authority rule to override the
moral rule. The second mistake emerges in the grown-up transgressions labeled as Whipping/temporal, Whipping/Authority,
Spanking/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority. These are not the
typical transgressions unambiguously “involving a victim who has
been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been
subject to an injustice”. The victims are also transgressors and
harm is inflicted on them as punishment. Plausibly, rules about
corporal punishment depend on authority in a way that rules
about harming the innocent do not.

1.

2

INTRODUCTION: DIVERGENT RESULTS AND THEIR EXPLANATION

Turiel and collaborators claim that people spontaneously make a systematic distinction between moral and conventional norms, suggesting
that moral and conventional rules are distinct natural kinds in the social/psychological domain. They devised an experimental paradigm
that is sometimes called the moral/conventional task. In this task participants have to judge transgressions of moral and conventional rules.
A questionnaire elicits from them the characteristics of each type of
transgression. The data show that transgressions involving a victim
who has been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has
been subject to an injustice are systematically judged to be seriously
wrong in any time and place, independently of the will or command of
any authority. Authorities cannot make the actions right in the moral
sense. These characteristics are not shared by transgressions of conventional rules.
Kelly et al. (2007) obtained experimental data showing that some
transgressions involving harm and a victim do not evoke the typical
response pattern of the moral/conventional task: they are judged to
be less serious, situated in time and place and dependent on authority.
They observe also that the transgressions found to evoke systematically
the typical moral signature response pattern are all transgressions that
happen among children in the schoolyard. In contrast, the transgressions in their study are performed by ‘grown ups’. But they do not claim
that this difference explains the divergent results obtained in their experiments. In fact, they raise the question whether the explanation
could be due to the contrast schoolyard/grown-up, but leave the answer open at the end of their paper:
“We believe that our findings raise two important questions
that must be addressed in future research. First, why did
previous research on schoolyard harm transgressions appear to support (C-2a)?1 Is there something special about
these simple harm transgressions that is not shared by the
more ‘grown-up’ transgressions that we also used in our
study?” (Kelly et al. 2007, p. 129)
In this paper I address this question. I note at the outset that the
problem may in fact be worse for the M/C distinction than they sugVol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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gest. The results of Kelly et al. (2007) are negative not only in relation to grown-up transgressions. Their battery of stories included two
schoolyard transgressions; and the results there are as bad for the M/C
distinction as those from the grown-up transgressions.
Two reasons, I shall argue, could provide the sought for explanation. Though they do not impinge on all items of their questionnaire
equally, together they cover 7 of the 9 items. The first reason concerns their use of mixed-domain situations (Turiel 1998, p. 909–910;
Nucci 2001, p. 95–97) in 6 items of their questionnaire. I shall argue
that this use is mistaken, because mixed-domain situations will produce divergent responses in the M/C task. This is due to their mixed
character, not to the dependence on authority of rules against harm.
Mixed-domain situations are such that:
1) Two normative domains range over the same action, one related to
a moral rule and one related to authority jurisdiction, and
2) The normative domains are in conflict, i.e., they pull agents or respondents in contradictory directions.
In situations of this type, it can happen that agents or respondents perceive only one of the two norms as salient, and sometimes it is the
authority rule; or they could perceive the conflicting requirements of
both rules and resolve the conflict each in their own way, sometimes
giving priority to the authority rule. This explains why responses diverge from the usual pattern in the M/C task in such cases, without
showing that moral rules are authority dependent. It shows that in
mixed-domain situations, for some agents or respondents, the authority rule overrides the moral rule. Explicit avoidance of mixed-domain
situations in the questionnaire would probably produce responses that
match the expectations of the moral/conventional task.
The second reason affects 4 items in their questionnaire, all of them
examples of grown-up transgression. They differ from the schoolyard type, but not because there is something special about the latter. It is rather these particular grown-up transgressions which are
special. The transgressions labeled as Whipping/temporal, Whipping/Authority, Spanking/ Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority are not
the typical transgressions unambiguously “involving a victim who has
been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been subwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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ject to an injustice”. In contrast to the original Hitting and the Hair
pulling schoolyard stories, the victims of the grown-up transgressions
are also themselves transgressors. The harm inflicted on them has the
quality of punishment. It is not unreasonable to assume that, for some
people, rules about corporal punishment depend on authority in a way
that rules about harming the innocent do not. In the following I shall
develop these two reasons in more detail.
2. MIXED-DOMAIN SITUATIONS

In order to explain the results in Kelly et al. (2007) and their divergence from the traditional responses to the M/C task, it is important
to realize that the greatest challenge for the M/C distinction comes
from cases where the harmed person is only a victim and not herself a
transgressor. These cases are represented in Kelly et al. by two typical
schoolyard stories about hitting and hair-pulling, where the targets of
harm are victims only. In their design they present these classical stories together with a corresponding reframed version, where the original
story follows an introduction saying: Suppose the teacher had said: “In
this school there is no rule against pulling hair (hitting).” They label
these items the Hair pulling/Authority and the Hitting/Authority cases.
This reframing is designed to establish whether rules involving harm to
innocent persons are considered by participants to be independent of
or dependent on authority. If the moral/conventional distinction is to
be confirmed, there should be little variation in the responses to the
original and reframed versions. However, 53% of participants say it is
Ok to hit (14% say it is Ok to pull hair) at school if the teacher says
it is permitted (reframed version), whereas only 14% say it is Ok to
hit (4% say it is Ok to pull hair) when the reference to the authority’s
command is omitted (original version). This is certainly a difference
that calls for an explanation; and it concerns the classical schoolyard
cases, not the grown-up ones. This result is the toughest challenge of
their experiment to the M/C distinction. Kelly et al. see it as evidence
against it. But the result is explained away by calling attention to what
Turiel and collaborators have called mixed-domain situations.
An example of mixed domains is where a father tells his son to
steal flowers from the neighbor’s garden. Another example is provided
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by the famous Milgram experiments on obedience to authority (Milgram 1974), where a scientist, presumably investigating the impact of
punishment on learning, commands participants to give electric shocks
(faked) to an innocent person each time she errs (a confederate that
simulates pain), contravening a moral rule against harming the innocent. A similar example is given when members of the military commit
crimes at the command of their superiors. Typical for these mixeddomain situations is the contradiction between a moral rule that prohibits the action and a rule prescribing obedience to an authority that
commands the action. For example, a command to steal or give electric shocks issued by parental or scientific authority contradicts a moral
rule against stealing or harming innocent people.
In the Hitting/Authority and the Hair pull/Authority items the
mixed situation is created when a moral transgression is reframed in
a story where an authority explicitly permits the transgression locally.
This is also the case in 4 other items in their questionnaire, labeled
the Spanking/ Authority, Prisoner abuse/ Authority, Whipping/ Authority and Military training/ Authority stories. Participants are thus
confronted with a situation that elicits both a moral rule against the
action and the rule of an authority that permits the action. Their responses will not be the same as when the situation only elicits a moral
rule against the action. The point about mixed-domain situations is
that participants feel the pull of two contradictory rules. They sometimes obey the authority, and sometimes not. In the case of the Milgram experiments, participants have sometimes obeyed in high percentages and have sometimes rejected almost unanimously the scientist’s command, depending on the experimental conditions (Milgram
1974; Turiel & Smetana 1984). Interestingly, the percentages of approval obtained by Kelly et al. in the pulling hair and hitting at school
stories are very different. When the authority permits the action, the
pulling hair and hitting stories elicited 53% and 14% of approval respectively. In itself, this large difference for two very similar actions
suggests the effect of an uncontrolled factor influencing participants’
perception of the salient rule, or participants’ resolution of the conflict
between rules. Presumably because of differences in personal character or cultural background, participants resolve the conflict differently.
No univocal prediction can be attempted without controlling for those
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factors.
In the design by Kelly et al. (2007) participants were not asked
whether the school authorities could legitimately change the moral
rules about hitting and hair pulling. Rather, it was assumed that they
had already issued rules permitting them. Moreover, the text suggests
that they issue rules with an explicit local scope (“at this school it is allowed...”). Participants would normally understand the rule as locally
valid at the school in question. The local character of the rule induces
participants to understand the situation as a mixed-domain situation,
where two different rules and two different concepts of wrong (or of
Ok, i.e., not wrong) apply: one is relative to authority and one is independent of authority. Participants responding that it is Ok to hit when
the school authority permits it could simply mean that it does not violate the authority’s rule. Understood in this way, the response obviously
does not imply that moral rules are judged as authority dependent. A
more explicit design would ask two questions to disambiguate: on one
hand, whether it would be wrong in the sense of violating the authority’s rule, and on the other, whether it would violate a moral rule; or
whether it would be wrong in any other sense. It could be argued
that this procedure presupposes a difference between two concepts of
wrongness, one dependent on and the other independent of authority.
But I take it that Kelly et al. (2007) do not question the existence of
these two senses of wrongness (a motivationally intrinsic and a motivationally extrinsic sense): what is at stake is whether rules involving
harm and rights invariably elicit the concept of wrongness that is authority independent. There is nothing methodologically wrong in a
procedure that makes these two senses explicit in the questionnaire.
The design used in Kelly et al. (2007) contrasts with one used
by Nucci (1985) and Nucci & Turiel (1993), described also in Nucci
(2001). The latter authors interviewed religious children and youths
regarding the difference between rules issued by religious authorities
and moral rules. The question posed to participants was about moral
rules as such and whether it would be wrong or not for religious authorities to change them, not just locally, but for every context. This
way of asking does not posit a hypothetical situation where two rules
apply, i.e., a mixed-domain situation. Rather, a participant has to think
explicitly about whether an authority has legitimate jurisdiction over
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a moral rule. This was contrasted with the same question regarding
matters of religious behavior. More than 90% of the catholic youths
said that it would be wrong for religious authorities to remove rules on
such transgressions as stealing or harming others, but only 40% said
that it would be wrong for the Pope to remove rules regarding religious
or even sexual behavior. Between 80% and 90% of Christian fundamentalists and orthodox Jews said that it would be wrong for religious
authorities to change moral rules. Their views about alterability of conventional rules contrast with the views of the Catholics. A high percentage of Orthodox Jews judged them unalterable by authorities, while on
average 60% of Christian fundamentalists judged conventional rules in
the same way. But this attitude to conventional rules follows from the
fact that Orthodox Jews and Christian fundamentalists, in contrast to
Catholics, take the word of God as immediately revealed in the Bible,
and not any religious authority, as the ultimate norm of religious behavior. When asked whether God, rather than religious authorities,
could change moral and conventional rules, around 90% of orthodox
Jews and Christian fundamentalists said that it would be wrong even
for God to change moral rules, though it would not be wrong for God
to change rules about matters of religious behavior. This result is in
line with the M/C distinction.
3.

HARMING AS PUNISHMENT

In the typical experiments that confirm the moral/conventional distinction, the transgressions studied were stealing, hitting, calumny and
damaging another’s property. These are the types of moral transgression used by Nucci (2001) in the experiment described above about
the views of religious children and youths concerning whether moral
rules could by altered at will by religious authorities, or even by God.
Targets of these transgressions are people depicted as innocent of any
previous harm, so they are genuine victims. In contrast, the battery of
stories used in Kelly et al. (2007) contains a group of 4 transgressions
where harm inflicted is in fact punishment of a transgressor. These 4
stories are the ones labeled Whipping/Temporal, Whipping/Authority,
Spanking/ Authority and Prisoner Abuse/Authority. Harming as punishment is here directed at people guilty either of a potential harm (as
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in whipping sailors when drunk on duty) or of a real harm. For example, in the Spanking/Authority story, a child is spanked for repeatedly
hitting other children.
There is an obvious difference between harming the innocent and
harming those that have harmed others. In the latter case, harm is a
reaction to previous aggression and is inflicted as punishment. Most
would agree that punishment is appropriate for moral transgressions,
though few would agree that corporal punishment is appropriate. However, many people endorse corporal punishment as legitimate for moral
transgressions. Though these people may believe that corporal punishment is morally justified, it is likely that they are aware of widespread
views to the contrary. Therefore, they feel more comfortable endorsing corporal punishment if an authority sanctions it as legitimate for
a given transgression. This conjecture would need experimental confirmation, but it is a reasonable hypothesis that could explain, in the
experiment by Kelly et al. (2007), the higher percentage of participants
who endorse corporal punishment when allowed by an authority. This
result does not imply that rules against harming the innocent are alterable by authorities, but only that the legitimacy of corporal punishment
is seen by some as subject to the decisions of authorities in their proper
jurisdictions.
We argued above that in the mixed-domain situations participants
who respond to the question: “Is it Ok to X?” understand the concept
of wrong/not wrong in different senses. Some may understand it in
the sense of morality and some in the sense of an authority-dependent
rule. But when the story is about corporal punishment, this difference
matters less, because its moral appropriateness may be viewed as dependent on the decision of authorities according to the circumstances.
That is, if some people view corporal punishment as morally appropriate when an authority permits it in her own jurisdiction, ambiguity in
the concept of wrongness plays no role. This fact alone can explain the
higher percentage of participants who endorse harm as punishment
when permitted by authorities. A combination of this effect with an
effect produced by an ambiguity in the concept of wrongness is also
possible. An experimental design could establish whether both effects
are present and their relative contributions.

Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences

9

Alejandro Rosas

4.

CONCLUSION

I have elaborated on two reasons that can explain, in seven of the nine
cases presented in the design by Kelly et al. (2007), why a higher percentage of people endorse harming others as appropriate when sanctioned by an authority. One is that people feel the pull of a rule to
obey authorities locally even when obedience to authority contravenes
a moral rule. The other is that some people believe that authorities
have jurisdiction to determine whether corporal punishment is morally
appropriate or not. Acting independently, these two reasons cover 7 of
the 9 stories used in Kelly et al. Both reasons can be acting together in
3 of the 4 cases that deal with corporal punishment (excluding Whipping/Temporal). Both reasons preserve the moral/conventional distinction as formulated by Turiel (1983). I have not addressed people’s
attitudes towards cannibalism, nor towards slavery. In the first case
victims are not involved; the story served a different purpose in their
paper. People’s attitudes towards slavery are potential evidence against
the distinction. They pose a difficult challenge in a complex issue that
should better be left for another occasion.
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Notes
1

In their reconstructive analysis C-2a is the claim: “Transgressions involving harm,
justice, or rights evoke the signature moral pattern”.
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